@article{PUB,
      recid = {4700},
      author = {Peterson, Timothy M. and Early, Bryan R.},
      title = {Does punishing sanctions busters work? Sanctions  enforcement and U.S. trade with sanctioned states},
      journal = {Political Research Quarterly},
      address = {2022},
      number = {PUB},
      year = {2022},
      note = {No additional notes.},
      abstract = {How can the government agencies responsible for enforcing  economic sanctions enhance their effectiveness? This study  explains how and why sanctions enforcement actions  undertaken by sender governments can discourage their firms  from trading with the states they sanction. Specifically,  we examine how the penalties imposed against sanctions  violators by the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of  Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) affect U.S. firms' trade with  target states. We argue that, because U.S. firms are  responsive to the risk being penalized and the disruptions  that penalties create, U.S. trade with sanctioned states  will be lower in the aftermath of OFAC enforcement actions.  The penalties' frequency and severity will magnify those  negative effects. We hypothesize that OFAC enforcement  actions taken against both U.S. and foreign sanctions  violators will negatively impact U.S. trade with targets.  Analyzing data from 2003-2015, we find that OFAC's  sanctions enforcement actions decrease U.S. trade with  sanctioned states in numerous ways.},
      url = {http://sanctionsplatform.ohchr.org/record/4700},
}