Abstract
The report examines 11 cases of sanctions relaxation by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States and groups them according to the core logics of different approaches to relaxation: (1) easing of sanctions’ implementation and exemptions; (2) selective delistings of individuals and entities; (3) sanctions suspensions; and (4) partial lifting of sanctions measures. Each case is unique, and the pursuit of a particular policy objective is not linked to a specific type of sanctions relief. Rather, like sanctions themselves, sanctions relaxation can be used flexibly to address a range of different political situations. Individual sanctions delistings have been used in the past to incentivize changes in behavior (Taliban, Belarus), encourage adherence to an agreement (Iran), stigmatize military elites (Haiti, Myanmar), prevent spoilers from destabilizing a new regime (Iraq), drive a wedge between different factions (Taliban), or signal the winding down of a sanctions regime (Angola, Iraq). Goodwill gestures and easing of sanctions implementation and exemptions have been used as an attempt to normalize diplomatic relations (Cuba), while suspensions have been employed in an effort to get targets to stop their support for terrorism (Libya), sign a peace agreement (former Yugoslavia, Haiti), or continue with its implementation (Angola). Partial liftings, for their part, have been used to encourage further progress on domestic reforms (Myanmar), support peacebuilding efforts (Liberia) and political transitions (Iraq), or reach an agreement on nuclear proliferation through carefully calibrated concessions and counterconcessions by the sender and the target (Iran).